I. Introduction

W
hether the interests of a nation are best served by maintaining f'Lxed exchange rates or by allowing exchange rates to vary continues to be a much debated issue among economists. Most of the earlier literature on this topic focused attention on the two extremes of completely fixed exchange rates versus the perfectly flexible or free floating system, examining the circumstances (degree of factor mobility, structure and origin of disturbances, etc.) under which one or the other would be preferred. More recently, several authors have adopted a different perspective by which the fixed and free float regimes are considered endpoints on a continuous spectrum of exchange rate flexibility [e.g. Boyer, 1978; Frenkel, Aizenman, 1982; Roper, Turnovsky, 1980] . Undoubtedly, this view was stimulated by the move toward a system of managed floating among the major world currencies since 1975, where governments intervene in foreign exchange markets to varying extents, but not enough to peg the exchange rate. The apparent payoff from this change in perspective is that it allows addressing the question: Under a given set of circumstances, what is the optimal level of exchange rate intervention, or the optimally managed float? Clearly, the ability to answer this question should lead to improved policy recommendations since, instead of having to choose between two, generally suboptimal exchange rate regimes, we have here the possibility of tailoring an exchange rate regime to a particular set of national circumstances.
The objective in this paper is to address the issue of an optimally managed float in the context of a rational expectations macromodel of an open economy. As Buiter [1979] already recognized in a similar endeavor, the search for an optimal foreign exchange market intervention strategy raises the same issues which had already been subjected to heated debates in earlier Keynesian-monetarist confrontations; these being the issue of "rules versus discretion" and the controversy over "targets, instruments and indicators" of policy. With respect to the first of these, Sargent and Wallace [1976, p. 169] state that "there is no longer any serious debate about whether monetary policy should be conducted according to rules or discretion," but that "the central practical issue.., is the appropriate form of the monetary policy rule". By casting the problem of optimal exchange rate management in the language of rational expectations equilibrium models, it becomes transparent that this issue also consists in essence of finding the appropriate feedback rule. Also, this treatment makes more transparent the distinction between a "managed float" and an "adjustable peg" system, a point which earlier disequilibrium treatments, such as Frenkel and Aizenman's [1982] discussion of "the optimal degree of fixity of exchange rates", left unclear. Here it becomes simply a question of which target variable is to be controlled by an optimal rule.
To obtain an optimal intervention strategy, the analysis will focus on the behavior of real variables under different policy rules. This confronts us with the well-known policy-ineffectiveness results which are common to a large class of equilibrium macromodels that display money neutrality [McCallum, 1980] . The central message from these results is that for government demand management policies to be systematically effective in influencing real behavior, public policy-makors must either be in possession of superior information or be in a better position to respond and adjust to new information than private agents, say because there are economies of scale or public goods involved. This paper does not strive to contribute to this policy-ineffectiveness debate. Instead, it grants the premise that the government policy-makers are in an advantageous position vis-a-vis private decision-makers with regard to the acquisition of information and the speed of response. This assumption is slightly relaxed in a second version of the model where, even though public and private decision-makers have the same access to information, contractual rigidities provide a hindrance to the speed with which private, but not public, agents can respond to current information.
In the next section, a basic macromodel for a small open economy is presented. Thereafter, the analysis is structured in three parts: First is presented the hypothetical case, to be used as a benchmark, where policymakers have perfect contemporaneous information on all economic shocks so that an intervention rule can be constructed on the basis of these shocks. Secondly, the analysis is repeated for the case where policy-makers only receive current information on a restricted set of variables. In this case the
